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Imperial Delusions
Tariq Ali

T

he most startling aspect of the 21st century—something that is
genuinely new—is that we have, for the first time in human history, the
existence of a single Empire. This is not the abstract utopian Empire
of Hardt-Negri, but something very concrete and real. The dominant
position of the United States has no precedent in history, which is why
Niall Ferguson’s assertion that China and Russia are imperial states is
completely unconvincing. The figures speak for themselves: there are
189 member states of the United Nations while there is a U.S. military
presence in some 140 countries. The increase of $8 billion in the U.S.
military budget in 2002 was the equivalent of China’s total military
expenditure. U.S. military spending is greater than the annual GDP of
Russia, India, Brazil, and much of Europe.
We are closer now than ever before to the ultra-imperialism predicted by Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretician of German socialism
of the early 20th century. Kautsky’s text, Der Imperialismus, was written
before the outbreak of the First World War, but published during its
early months, despite the fact that the war itself—a classic demonstration of inter-imperialist contradictions—had dynamited Kautsky’s
central thesis, namely, that the latest phase of capitalist development
would abolish inter-imperialist conflicts forever.1
Kautsky insisted on publishing his text, and for good reason. He
believed that the growing rise of anti-colonial movements in Asia and
the Arab East would compel imperialism to close ranks against a common enemy. He argued that the arms race would become an unaccept-
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able burden on capitalism, necessitating a strategy of peace, not war,
between the major imperialist powers. On this last point, of course,
he was proved wrong. Military spending helped to protect capitalism
after the Depression of the 1930s, as demonstrated by Germany, Japan,
and the United States.
It would take another inter-imperialist war to bring the capitalist
world to its senses. The refusal of German imperialism to accept the
division of the world into British and French zones brought about the
Second World War. Its spread to the Soviet Union and Asia created the
basis for the spread of revolution. Vietnam, China, Korea, and Indonesia benefited from the inter-imperialist conflicts. It was only after the
defeat of Germany and Japan that the capitalist world accepted U.S.
leadership, though former rivals secretly celebrated U.S. defeats in
Cuba and Vietnam. Nonetheless, the existence of a Communist world
forced capitalism to discipline its competitive urges in the politicomilitary sphere. The U.S., uniquely in the history of empires, rebuilt its
defeated and war-devastated rivals: German, Japanese, and West European capitalism. In return, these states accepted U.S. leadership. In
Kautsky’s words, the result of the World War between the great imperialist powers could be a federation of the strongest, who renounce
their arms race. What he predicted after the first global conflict actually
happened after the Second World War. However, as long as the noncapitalist world existed, there was still some space for maneuver. The
Scandinavians and the French under de Gaulle were strongly opposed
to the U.S. war in Vietnam and not a single NATO country dispatched
troops to help the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 changed all that and brought
about a new unarmed struggle for hegemony. There could only be one
victor: the United States. The major European states might moan and
grumble and search eagerly for crumbs of comfort (multilateralism, the
U.N., etc.), but U.S. politico-military hegemony was unchallengeable.
The British and Italian leaders accepted this and positioned themselves
permanently in the posterior of the U.S. Empire. Despite this, the old
spectre could not be completely exorcised.
A new question arose. Given that there is no real enemy to unite the
capitalist world (the notion of Islam as an enemy is ludicrous), might
not inter-imperialist contradictions re-emerge? And, horror of horrors,
might they lead to war? This question was not posed by isolated Marxists in the Western academies. It was first raised in the White House
during the reign of George Bush I. An Afghan-American ideologue,
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Zalmay Khalilzad, published an essay in which he suggested that U.S.
hegemony had to be preserved at all costs, if necessary by force! The
disintegration of Yugoslavia (a direct result of global economics and
inter-imperialist rivalries within the European Union) consumed the
Clinton White House. U.S. intervention in the Yugoslav civil war was
an assertion of raw power. Rwanda, where a real genocide was in
motion, was ignored.
*****
During the first half of the 20th century, when the British still occupied India and a nationalist movement had erupted against the British
Empire, sundry U.S. journalists were dispatched to observe the scene
and interview Mahatma Gandhi. “What,” one of them asked the Indian
leader, “do you think of Western civilization?” The old fox smiled. “It
would be a good idea,” he replied. Seventy-five years later, Iraqis suffering the abuses of an oppressive first year under the U.S. occupation
would probably endorse Gandhi’s sentiment.
To sell the Iraq installment of the war against terrorism, the U.S.
had justified it as necessary to free the good and common people from
a tyrant. Once removed, and with the benefit not of foreign nationbuilders but of bureaucrats to ease the transition, the path would clear,
swords would be turned into ploughshares, and the desert would
bloom in a transformed and democratized Middle East. If at home
President Bush and his cadre of acolytes were merchants of fear, on the
road, to justify foreign adventures, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and colleagues were merchants of hope.
Many in the West hoped that the U.S. intervention in Iraq would
lead to democracy. Few in Iraq suffered such illusions. They were only
too aware that at the height of the repression in Iraq, Saddam Hussein
had been a favored Western ally, barely criticized in the U.S. media.
What has happened has confirmed Iraqi doubts. At a single nod from
the conquerors, timeservers such as Ahmed Chalabi (aptly described in
The New Yorker as the man “who sold the war”) are reduced to primitive obscurity. Saddam’s former ally (whom Saddam later tried to have
killed), the ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi, is the new puppet prime minister.
All this is welcomed by the “international community,” showing once
again that it is the wealth and military strength of the U.S. that enables
it to buy the services of poorer and weaker states.
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In any case, with the revelations of the abuses at prisons in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cuba, the U.S. has lost whatever moral authority it
purported to have, and the result is a genuine clash of civilizations—
one that easily could have been avoided.
In the spring of 1917, when the British entered Iraq, the statement
of purpose was similarly virtuous. The generals and their battalions
came not as conquerors but as liberators. To allow that controlling Iraq
was part of a grander design to secure the Middle East as a European
access route to Asia would have divested the occupying force of the
moral authority necessary for success. Always, the occupier requires a
mask as the benign bestower of a better life, a better “civilization.”
The British, of course, had assets the U.S. lacks. One was a long and
storied colonial legacy rooted in a commitment to settlement. Legions
decamped from the British Isles to populate the globe. At home, they
were the marginalized, the impoverished, the outcasts; abroad, they
became the pioneers, the entrepreneurs, the pirates. Through the ingenious workings of mercantilism they filled the treasury of Westminster with ever-ballooning capital and established Britain as the world’s
banker. Most importantly, the British embraced their empire as a righteous, utilitarian, and civilizing force.
In contrast, latter-day Americans suffer from intellectual and historical amnesia, and a sense of denial bordering on the delusional. Despite
U.S. insistence to the contrary, we have the existence of a single empire.
It is the American Empire at the beginning of the “New American
Century.” The U.S. military is stationed in 138 countries. In key geopolitical regions such as the Middle East, it secures strategic partnerships
through the provision of defense services, military hardware, and corporate investment. This is especially true in Israel and Saudi Arabia,
the Middle Eastern bête noires for Muslim fundamentalists. Israel is a
false economy, more and more dependent on Western capital inflows
and by the day losing its claim to being the region’s only democracy. In
Saudi Arabia, U.S. corporate investments exceed $400 million a year,
and U.S. companies have more than two hundred joint ventures (principally in the petrochemical and energy sectors) with Saudi Arabian
companies. Certainly support for Israel opens the door to Islamic and
Arab charges that the West aids and abets the unlawful occupation and
confinement of Palestinians. But, post-Iraq, all indications now suggest
that the longstanding reciprocity between the U.S. and the House of
Saud—to Islamic critics, oil in exchange for military bases in the home
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of Mecca and Medina—will result in Saudi Arabia’s becoming a new
hotbed and target of Islamic militancy.
In the absence of a system wherein the financial benefits of foreign
investment accrue directly to the U.S. treasury, the costs of maintaining and expanding this empire should be the key issue in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election. Notwithstanding the U.S.’s status as the world’s
largest debtor nation, the present administration appears committed to
military budgets in excess of the next fifteen largest nations combined.
What, after all, is this global overreach putting at risk? If the economists are correct, how can social security checks, state medical insurance, the welfare state, and so on, be sustained in the face of a balance
sheet that reads $45 trillion in the hole? But, given the administration’s
refusal to use the “E” word, President Bush’s beliefs in divine guidance
and “might is right,” and only faint challenges from American liberals
to U.S. imperial aspirations, it is hard to imagine a change of course.
The most recent evidence of historical amnesia and a messiah complex lies in the lack of a measured exit strategy following “Operation
Iraqi Freedom,” a war whose rapid result could have been guessed by
grade-school children. (Tony Blair knew that it would be a long haul.
The complicity in this charade by the British prime minister, whose
country’s earlier occupation of Iraq lurched on until 1955, proves that
the diseases of blind faith and hubris have spread across the Atlantic.)
But there is more to it. The absence of planning bespeaks a collective
mind existing in a permanent present, and an adolescent insistence
that “history begins with us.”
Contributing to this permanent present are television and the Internet, two “assets” the colonial British were free of, and it is these tools of
communication that have caused the U.S. to lose both the propaganda
war and its moral authority. (After Gulf War I, embedding journalists
was a brilliant strategic ploy, which, with rare exceptions, successfully contained the story for the homeland audience. In hindsight,
this may have been the only “mission accomplished.”) In the interregnum between President Bush’s proclamation of victory and the day
of uneasy transition to a dubious Iraqi self-rule, the bombs and body
counts continued to soar and the negative news became a daily headline. The image is more powerful than the word, and matters reached
their nadir when the torture photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison
were broadcast on Arab television and released over the Internet. The
damage could not be controlled; the mask was off. On the ground, the
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liberators suddenly looked no better than the Baathist thugs of Saddam Hussein’s security militias.
The Taguba Inquiry confirmed independent reports that U.S. soldiers had raped women prisoners. Some of them were forced to bare
their breasts for the camera. The women detainees sent messages to
the resistance, pleading with them to bomb and destroy the prison and
obliterate their shame and suffering. As far back as November 2003,
word was getting out. Early in 2004, The Guardian reported a woman
prisoner pleading, “We have daughters and husbands. For God’s sake
don’t tell anyone about this.” Another Iraqi prisoner, a male, was more
forthright: “We need electricity in our homes, not up the arse.” This
was Western civilization at its most raw, and reprisals were inevitable.
Circulating on the streets of Baghdad is a photograph of a U.S.
soldier having sex with an Iraqi woman: War as pornography. In the
West, this and similar images have been suppressed. (Was it out of
deference to John Ashcroft, the U.S. Attorney General, a fanatical evangelist who blushed each day when he saw the stone breasts of the gorgeous Spirit of Justice in the hallway outside his office and so had them
covered?) Was the Pentagon fearful of the reaction from the world
at large? And what about the women of Afghanistan, who, we were
informed only a few years ago by the White House First Ladies Hillary
Clinton and Laura Bush, would be liberated by invasion and occupation? The women are still waiting, while rapes and tortures in that
country go unreported.
Into this amoral terrain, the other side responded with eye-for-aneye justice. The Iraqi resistance responded to the U.S. rapes and torture
with kidnappings, car bombings targeting U.S. military and civilians
alike, and, in Saudi Arabia (because, to the resistance, this war is borderless), ritualized beheadings of Western hostages. At first, the images
of rape and torture trickled out (shame seemingly keeping their reproduction in check), but the opportunity to exploit these hideous transgressions was too ripe, too available, and the slow seepage became a
flood. Newly equipped, local mullahs, clerics from neighboring states,
and others demanding the immediate evacuation of the “Western
infidels” busily recast the short history of the war: Since Gulf War I,
the West has been bombing Iraq; economic sanctions, not the Baathist
regime, crippled its opportunity; and only we can protect the proud
face of Islam against the Christian hordes. One can hear the chant: “I
ask you, which civilization, Islam or the West, is collapsing?”
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I was in Egypt and Lebanon when news of the Abu Ghraib torture
broke. I did not meet a single person (not even among Europeans and
North Americans who work there) who was surprised. Outside the
U.S., the echoes of history have never ceased to resonate. The tortures
in Iraq revived memories of Aden and Algeria, Vietnam, and, yes,
Palestine. But what can explain the shock evinced by so many in the
West when the torture was made public? One can excuse forgetting
the Inquisition or the Ordeal by Fire or the heresy-hunters of Christianity who tortured and killed Cathars and Albigensians, or, later, the
majestic polemic by Voltaire against the cruelty of torture. But have
the citizens of North America forgotten what happened in South and
Central America, Asia, and Africa less than fifty years ago? When dead
Iraqis are not even counted, why the surprise that the living ones are
mistreated? To understand this collective amnesia we must, against the
strongest impulses of a U.S. administration intoxicated by the future,
straddle the present while stepping back in time.
On June 8, 2004, The Financial Times reported that U.S. lawyers said,
“American interrogators can legally violate a U.S. ban on the use of
torture abroad,” and “legal statutes against torture could not override
Mr. Bush’s inherent powers.” From leaked administration documents,
it is now clear that the U.S. justification for torture at Abu Ghraib
(and at Guantanamo Bay) was predicated on the notion that Al-Qaida
“irregulars” do not observe, and therefore cannot be covered by, the
laws of war. In the battle against these anarchic warriors—this asymmetric devil intent on destruction—the U.S. sought to circumvent not
only the Geneva Conventions but also its own 1996 U.S. War Crimes
Act. It is pointless to pretend that the implicated GIs were indulging
in spontaneous fun. The soldiers were wrong to obey orders, but who
will punish their leaders?
Collective memory loss in the West could be the result of a superiority complex. We won. We defeated the “Evil Empire.” Our culture,
our civilization is infinitely more advanced than anything else—which
might explain the shock waves created by the torture revelations at
Abu Ghraib. One of the features of domination is that those who do
not identify with it are categorized as the enemy. George W. Bush’s
post-September 11 injunction, “If you’re not with us, you’re with the
terrorists,” was, for a while, accepted without question throughout the
Western world and by elites everywhere. It was merely an adaptation
of the New Testament’s, “He who is not with me is against me.” The
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notion that he might not be against you but in favor of something more
constructive was/is regarded as impermissible.
It was Carl Schmitt, a gifted legal theorist of the Third Reich, who
insisted that the totality of politics was encompassed by the essential
categories of “friend” and “enemy.” This view suited most empires
and Schmitt’s writings were influential in the United States after the
Second World War. Conservative thinkers such as Leo Strauss acknowledged his influence. The message—studied, learned, and adopted by
the “Straussians” now surrounding President Bush—was straightforward: if your country does not serve the interests of our empire, it is an
enemy state. It must be occupied, its leaders removed, and more pliant
satraps placed on the throne. In time, they hoped, the presence of a
Roman legion would become unnecessary. However, soon after the
legion withdraws, the satrapy begins to crumble. Occupation, withdrawal, rebellion, another occupation, and, sometimes, self-emancipation, is a pattern in world history.
To justify their excesses, imperial regimes require intellectual legitimizers. In the U.S., the torch was passed from Leo Strauss and the Chicago School to Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Huntington
was a senior counterinsurgency expert in the Johnson administration at
the time of the Vietnam War. His fertile imagination contributed to the
scheme of “strategic hamlets,” after studying the insurgent texts of the
enemy—Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Vo Nguyen Giap—
on guerrilla warfare in which all four practitioners explained that success was impossible without the support of the population. Failing to
understand what motivated the guerrilla fighters or the causes of the
war, and believing the main problem was the links of the resistance to
the people (“fish in water,” according to Mao), Huntington conceived
of separating the two. The scheme envisaged herding poor peasants
into “strategic hamlets,” which were glorified rural concentration
camps surrounded by barbed wire and guarded day and night by soldiers. The U.S. military decided to give it a try. What Huntington and
his superiors had failed to grasp was that many of “the people” were,
in fact, members or supporters of the Vietnamese resistance. Soon they
began to organize inside the strategic hamlets. The weaknesses of each
hamlet were mapped and dispatched to the guerrillas, and the scheme
came to an ignominious end.
Fukuyama did not engage in anything as dramatic. However, as
a State Department employee, he wrote a policy paper on Pakistan
during the years of General Zia’s brutal dictatorship. He suggested
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that Pakistan turn its back on India and concentrate on its links with
the Islamic world, i.e., the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The generals
were grateful for this advice, which suited their material and strategic needs, and they admired Fukuyama’s démarche. When the Berlin
Wall came down, a new version of an old idea—the triumph of liberal
democracy—began to agitate Fukuyama.
Then came the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of a peculiar form of gangster capitalism in that world. Did the
triumph of capitalism and the defeat of an enemy ideology mean we
were in a world without conflict or enemies? Both Fukuyama and
Huntington produced important books responding to the new situation. Fukuyama, obsessed with Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capitalism as the only embodiment of the “world-spirit” that now marked the
“end of history,” a phrase that became the title of his book. The long
war was over and the restless world-spirit could now relax and buy
a condo in Miami. Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any
available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, politics, and economics of the Other—each and every variety of Socialism/
Marxism—had disappeared under the ocean, a submerged continent
of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irreversible. It was a universal triumph.
Huntington was unconvinced, however, and warned against complacency. From his Harvard base, he challenged Fukuyama with a set
of theses first published in Foreign Affairs as “The Clash of Civilizations?” (a phrase originally coined by Bernard Lewis, another favorite
of the current administration). Subsequently, these papers became a
book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The
question mark had now disappeared. Huntington agreed that no ideological alternatives to capitalism existed, but this did not mean the
“end of history.” Other antagonisms remained: “The great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural… . The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.” In
particular, Huntington emphasized the continued importance of religion in the modern world, and it was this that propelled the book onto
the bestseller lists after September 11.
What did he mean by the word “civilization”? Early in the last
century, Oswald Spengler, the grandson of a German miner, had abandoned his vocation as a teacher, turned to philosophy and history, and
produced a master text. In The Decline of the West, Spengler counterposed culture (a word philologically tied to nature, the countryside,
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and peasant life) with civilization, which is urban and would become
the site of industrial anarchy, dooming both capitalist and worker to a
life of slavery to the machine-master. For Spengler, civilization reeked
of death and destruction and imperialism. Democracy was the dictatorship of money and “money is overthrown and abolished only by
blood.” The advent of “Caesarism” would drown democracy in blood
and become the final episode in the history of the West. Had the Third
Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the
spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk,
and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are
buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or the
Ardennes), Spengler’s prediction might have come close to realization.
Spengler was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism,
and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not its
language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage:
I see, in a place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a
number of mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from
the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole lifecycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its
own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life,
will and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures,
peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks
and stone-pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has its
own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and
never return… . 2

In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive cycle of civilization:
Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species
of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built
petrifying world city following mother-earth…they are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again… . Imperialism
is civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the
West is now irrevocably set… . Expansionism is a doom, something daemonic and intense, which grips, forces into service and uses up the late
humanity of the world-city stage.3
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Three-quarters of a century later, Huntington returned to Spenglerian themes but inverted their message. He amalgamated culture
and civilization. For him, a civilization is a metaculture, “the highest
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity
people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.” Huntington’s chart of the top eight cultures/civilizations consists
of Western, Sino/Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and, reluctantly, African. (The reluctance is due
to an inner voice that injects doubt as to whether Africa really qualifies
as a civilization.) Religion is “perhaps the central force that motivates
and mobilizes people.” The gulf is between “the West and the Rest.”
The West is the only civilization that defends freedom, democracy, and
the free market, while the rest resist Western efforts to advance these
noble values. The West is at the height of its power and, argues Huntington, utilizes the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund to impose its will globally. He discards the notion of a real difference between unilateralism and multilateralism because “the very
phrase the ‘world community’ has become the euphemistic collective
noun to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the
United States and other Western powers.” He is correct on this, if not
on religion.
I do not believe that faith is the main determinant of global mass
mobilizations. It plays a part, the extent of which is variable. The West
is certainly divided on this. Europe is not deeply religious, whereas in
the U.S., the situation is the reverse. According to the latest surveys,
95% of Americans believe in God, including 91% of those who define
themselves as liberals. (A recent Gallup briefing [February 25, 2003]
reveals a bipartisan belief in the horned one. The Democrats are so
pious that 67% of them actually believe in the Devil, only twelve percentage points below the Republicans. This tickles me because “Who
believes in the Devil,” wrote Thomas Mann in Doctor Faustus, “already
belongs to him.”) Neither in China nor Russia does religion play a similar role, and I am convinced there are more unbelievers in the house of
Islam than can ever be counted in public, but this is a theme to which I
shall return below.
In Huntington’s world, the most dangerous combination would be
the unity of Confucian and Islamic civilizations, neither of which shares
the West’s attachment to human rights. And both of which, he might
have added, could hold the West to ransom. The U.S. global strategy
necessitates control of the world’s oil reserves, while domestically its
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economy is heavily dependent on cheap imports from China. Wary of
China, the U.S. is pushing to open it up for business, and betting that
the steamroller of American culture and product selling will take hold.
The Chinese masses, it is hoped, will be satiated by shopping.
Soon after Huntington’s book appeared, others joined the fray and
stressed the importance of cultural differences in understanding politics, economics, demography, and so on. Much of this was sidelined
after September 11 focused the debate on the “threat of radical Islam”
and the “war against terror.” Instead of the West against the Rest, the
new turn made it the Rest versus Islam. Huntington, to his credit,
was not tempted by the neoconservative arguments dominating White
House ideology before the debacle in Iraq. He modified his own views
and argued that it was a clash within Islam that was the main problem
and not one of civilizations. This was not the case either, but certainly
made one wonder how this could be squared with his view that “faith
and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what
they will fight and die for.”
What is this Islam, this new bogeyman used to frighten the children? The very idea of Islam as an institutional matrix that organizes
terror and resistance to the West throughout the globe is a travesty of
past and present. For most of the 20th century, organized or political
Islam was, more often than not, supportive of the British Empire, and
later, its American successor. It was a conservative social force, rattling
the chains of superstition and fanaticism to stifle even the most fragile
tremors of radical revolution. Throughout the Cold War, the Wahhabi
preachers of Saudi Arabia (currently viewed as Enemy No.1) were dispatched across the Muslim world to preach the virtues of religion and
counterrevolution. Where divine truth would not prevail over reason,
there were always purses pregnant with petrodollars to help win new
recruits. Where neither worked, the U.S. organized a military coup.
One such case was Indonesia.
At college in Pakistan during the early 1960s, Muslim socialists like
me were in a permanent debate with the Islamists, who would declare
that religion and the state were indivisible because “Islam is a complete
code of life.” We used to laugh when we heard this sentence and often
preempt them by mouthing it ourselves in parrot fashion. Sometimes,
when debates became heated, we would ask, “Which is the largest
Muslim country in the world?” Back would come the reply, “Indonesia!” Another question would be hurled back by our side, “Which is
the largest Communist Party in the non-communist world?” Silence.
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We would chant in unison, “The Communist Party of Indonesia.”
These youthful exchanges were not pure banter. We were arguing that
it was perfectly possible to be part of Muslim culture and appreciate its
finer points without being a believer. The Indonesian Left (more than a
million-and-a-half strong) was wiped out in 1965 by General Suharto.
It was one of the worst massacres of the Cold War, fully backed by the
U.S. The vacuum in Indonesia created by the massacres left the field
clear for the Army and the Islamists. The same pattern, if not on the
same scale, occurred elsewhere.
I remember well the mood that gripped Pakistan during 1969–70. A
three-month-long rebellion against a pro-U.S. military dictator by students, workers, and peasants had triggered a societal upsurge. Lawyers
took to the streets one day, prostitutes the next. The dictatorship crumbled and the country’s first-ever general election took place. Throughout the campaign the secular, socialist currents dominated politics.
The religious groups were totally marginalized and often resorted to
violence. As a visiting academic, when I arrived in Multan to address a
rally of nearly fifty thousand workers and peasants, the student wing
of the Jamaati-Islami physically attacked the group of students who
had come to meet me at the airport and escort me to the meeting. They
stoned us as the police stood by and watched. This was a common
occurrence in those days, but the intimidation didn’t work.
The 1970 Pakistani elections saw the Islamists wiped out as a political
force. When, in 1972, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was addressing a rally in Lahore, a group of mullahs started abusing him. Bhutto,
who often spoke at several meetings a day, had an attendant who carried a tiny whisky flask and when the prime-ministerial voice became
too hoarse, a glass containing amber liquid would appear and relieve
the prime minister’s exhaustion. At the Lahore rally there were half-amillion people present as well as diplomats and foreign journalists. As
Bhutto sipped from the glass, a bearded man stood up, pointed at him,
and shouted, “Look, people. See what he is drinking.” Bhutto, who
loved repartee, held up the glass and declared, “Yes, look. It’s sherbet.”
The crowd roared with laughter. The well-placed mullahs stood up in
different places and replied, “It’s sharab (alcohol).” Finally Bhutto lost
his temper and shouted, “Fine. Yes, you mother***, it is sharab. Unlike
you, I don’t drink the blood of the people.” The crowd was ecstatic. A
spontaneous chant arose and rent the air: “Long may our Bhutto live!
Long may our Bhutto drink!”
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Times are different now, but not just in the Islamic world. I emphasize these very different events in Indonesia and Pakistan to show
that the two largest Muslim states were subjected to the same political
storms and influences as the non-Muslim world. I am no apologist
for radical Islam, the widespread corruption of Islamic kingdoms, the
atavistic mullahs and Quranic literalists, or the utter venality of the
House of Saud. But if Muslim civilization has become a spent force
(see Bernard Lewis’ What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response) in need of top-down reform, one must eschew political
agendas and deconstruct what actually happened. We require a social
vision that transcends religious conservatism in the Islamic world, and
the American model simply will not work. It has proven itself an unviable alternative. In Indonesia and Pakistan there was an internal dynamism demanding reform. Those deemed Communists or Socialists by
successive U.S. administrations were, in fact, moderates committed to
democratization. They were the reformers in need of foreign support.
Over and over again, U.S. Cold War myopia resulted in backing the
wrong side. Today in the Middle East there will be no transformation
until the West answers the simple questions being asked on the street:
Why Iraq and not Saudi Arabia? Why blanket support for Israel and
blindness to Palestinian suffering?
This is why I reject the civilizational theses of Huntington and
Islamist ideologues who also believe that the difference of religion and
blood is the determining divide in the modern world. And I reject the
deracinated “house Muslims” in the North American and European
diasporas, so desperate to please, so eager to be integrated on any basis
that they sink to their knees and join the sickly chorus, winning the
earthly rewards of media attention and tenure. At the top of this heap
lies Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi handmaiden to the White House operatives.
One point is repeatedly made by professors of human rights on U.S.
campuses and by “civil society” groups in order to justify Western
interventions, including the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is that
democracy and the plurality of institutions independent of the state,
but rooted in capitalism, define the culture of the West. In 1919, an
anti-imperialist wind arose in Afghanistan and the tribal confederacy
accepted Amanullah as the king. He was a modernizer and admirer
of Kemal Ataturk. His wife Soraya was a proto-feminist. The nationalist intellectuals in Amanullah’s circle prepared a draft constitution. It
included universal adult franchise. If it had been implemented, women
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in Afghanistan would have obtained the vote before their sisters in
Britain and the West. The reason it wasn’t implemented was that the
British, via the experienced agent T. E. Lawrence, stoked up a few
tribes, paid them, and told them that women were being encouraged to
become prostitutes. The British themselves then intervened to topple
Amanullah.
Ironically, as the culture of democratic life deteriorates in the West,
there is a growing demand for self-expression in much of the Muslim
world. The citizens of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Syria
and the Gulf statelets, are desperate to choose their own governments,
but there is a problem. It is what Huntington has referred to as “the
democratic paradox.” In plain language, democracy might produce
elected governments hostile to the U.S. This is true. It might. That’s
why Washington prefers the kleptocratic Saudi dynasty and the motheaten military regime in Egypt.
And Iraq? The appointment of Iyad Allawi, an ex-CIA agent, as the
new prime minister, and the infamous Cold War hawk John Negroponte as the new U.S. ambassador, is an indication of the tortures that
lie ahead for the citizens of Iraq. The demand for an elected constituent assembly (first put forward by Ayatollah Sistani) is straight out of
the French Revolution. But it would probably produce a government
that would unite the country on the basis of two clear-cut aims: the
withdrawal of all foreign troops and Iraqi control of Iraqi oil. To have
occupied a country and then watch it flout the Washington Consensus
would be too painful. So puppets are appointed and the resistance
continues.
Meanwhile, in neighboring Iran, a decrepit clerical regime is increasingly isolated from the population. Sixty-three percent of the people
are under thirty years of age. All they have known is the rule of the
clerics. They want something different. Despite the clerics, Iran has
a vibrant semi-clandestine culture. The Iranian new-wave cinema is
flourishing and, as enthusiastic exploiters of the Internet, Iran’s dissident bloggers dominate cyberspace. While the clerics continue to suppress free speech (closing down dissident newspapers such as Neshat),
such reprisals are addressed in courts of law. Iran offers hope. When
the clerics are defeated, the people of this country who accepted the
leadership of the mullahs to get rid of the Shah might inaugurate a reformation with far-reaching effects. I would not be surprised if mosque
and state were divided forever after another upheaval in Iran. In the
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current climate, Iranian self-emancipation would be seriously delayed
or halted by foreign intervention.
Recall that in 1995, Zalmay Khalilzad (currently the proconsul in
Kabul and busy negotiating deals with Taliban factions to preserve his
puppet protegé) published an essay in which he suggested that U.S.
hegemony had to be preserved at all costs, if necessary by force. September 11 provided the opportunity to try out the theory. For President
Bush II, Ahmed Chalabi provided a perfect bookend to this history, but
Iraq is proof that the use of force can provoke a mighty resistance.
Cultures and civilizations are now, and have always been, hybrids.
To suggest otherwise is to fall prey to the twin devils of ideology and
chauvinism. The tragedy of the abuses at Abu Ghraib is that they created a clash of civilizations where no such clash had existed. Through
its own myopia, the West has given radical Islam the ammunition for
which it was thirsting. In the short term, President Bush will insist that
his hands are clean and that the forces of darkness are behind every
door. If this blindness and these lies persist, the long-term prospects
are too desperate to contemplate. 
•
Notes
1. The German text of Kautsky’s piece was published in Die Neue Zeit on September 11,
1914. It was translated into English for the first time by the New Left Review, and published as “Ultra-Imperialism,” New Left Review 59 (January–February 1970).
2. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
3. Ibid.
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